دانلود پاورپوینت operational Safety

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عنوان های پاورپوینت  : 

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operational Safety

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Outline

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Operational Nuclear Safety

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Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model

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Culture is fundamental

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Generic problem

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Generic problem

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Findings

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Event investigations

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Human Factors in events

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The learning loop

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Closing the learning loop

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Review findings

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Guiding Principles

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Outcome

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Measurable benefit

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Outcome

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Management of Change

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Weakness

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Safety Management

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Behavioural interventions

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The sharp end

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\n\nقسمت ها و تکه های اتفاقی از فایل\n\nOutline\n\nOperational nuclear safety\n\nFocus on nuclear safety and underlying cultural issues\n\nsafety systems and processes (but not safety cases)\n\nExample License Condition requirements\n\nOperating experience feedback (LC 7)\n\nOperating rules (LC 23)\n\nManagement of change (LC 36)\n\nBehavioural interventions to improve performance\n\nOverall safety management system\n\nOperational Nuclear Safety\n\nRemaining within the limits of the safety case\n\nProcedures, monitoring, analysis and learning processes\n\nSuitably qualified, experienced and competent staff\n\nGood management\n\nGood safety culture\n\nthe right things are done with the right attitude so as to achieve the right results\n\n \n\nReason’s Swiss Cheese Model\n\nDefence in depth (many layers)\n\nWorks most of the time\n\nAll have weaknesses\n\nCan line up with disastrous results\n\nCulture is fundamental\n\nThe culture determines the quality of the safety management processes\n\nHow big the holes in the cheese are\n\nHow they are monitored and reduced\n\nHelps ensure they are not aligned\n\nGeneric problem\n\nGeneric problem\n\nFindings\n\nHigh proportion (by far) of events attributed to human factors\n\n \n\nTop four root causes:\n\nPersonnel work practices\n\nProcedures\n\nVerbal communications\n\nSupervisory methods\n\n \n\nEvent investigations\n\nOften don’t ask ‘why’ enough\n\nIts easiest to focus on the individual\n\n \n\n…...but this won’t help to move things forward and prevent future events\n\n \n\nKey is know why the individuals behaved as they did – what are the human factors?\n\n \n\nHuman Factors in events\n\nThe learning loop\n\nClosing the learning loop\n\nReview findings\n\nRules were sometimes\n\nnot clearly written (poor language, over complex)\n\ncontained no operational margin\n\nwere not relevant to nuclear safety\n\n \n\nRules “invited” the operators to breach them\n\n \n\nGuidance was needed for rewriting the Rules\n\nGuiding Principles\n\nP3\n\nThe operating limits set out in the rules should be such that a breach represents a significant erosion of safety, commensurate with the external attention it attracts\n\nP10\n\nA clear identification is required of which rules are appropriate to normal steady state conditions and which to other situations (including faults, start-up, post-trip and shut-down situations).\n\nP11\n\nRules should (so far as is practicable) refer only to plant parameters and conditions which can be directly monitored (and preferably be directly controlled) by the station staff.\n\nP12\n\nRules should not require staff to process information presented to them unless the appropriate support is provided.\n\nP15\n\nRules should use derived operating limits which anticipate faults, rather than basic safety limits.\n\nOutcome\n\nMany principles concerned with making the Rules easier to follow and comply with i.e. making the operators’ job easier\n\nProgramme of Rule revision\n\nVery significant reduction in Rule breaches\n\nMeasurable benefit\n\nOutcome\n\nMany principles concerned with making the Rules easier to follow and comply with i.e. making the operators’ job easier\n\nProgramme of Rule revision\n\nVery significant reduction in Rule breaches\n\nGreater credibility of Rules\n\nGreater regulator and public confidence\n\nGreater self awareness and self confidence\n\nManagement of Change\n\nNewest License Condition (LC36)\n\nIntroduced to address the increasing instability in UK Nuclear Industry since 1989\n\nRestructuring, privatisation, downsizing, re-organisation (local and corporate), contractorisation, competition\n\nLoss of experience, uncertainty (role, job security)\n\nRequires formal statement of how nuclear safety is ensured during and after the change\n\nKey performance indicators to monitor the change\n\n \n\n \n\n \n\n30 تا 70 درصد پروژه | پاورپوینت | سمینار | طرح های کارآفرینی و  توجیهی |  پایان-نامه |  پی دی اف  مقاله ( کتاب ) | نقشه | پلان طراحی |  های آماده به صورت رایگان میباشد ( word | pdf | docx | doc )